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Article 9

REINVENTING THE SECURITY COUNCIL:
THE U.N. AS A LOCKEAN SYSTEM
Michael D. Rasey*
INTRODUCTION

Legal assessments of U.S. action against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in 2002-2003 fall into two broad categories.' Some see
the U.S. action as a rejection of the U.N. system of collective security
and rules on the use of force-a result that might be either applauded
or condemned. 2 Others emphasize that the U.S. action, while opposed by many members of the U.N. Security Council, fell within the
broad authorization of use of force against Iraq contained in prior
Security Council resolutions, so that the letter of U.N. law was
3
respected despite what individual Council members felt at the time.
* Professor of Law, University of San Diego.
1 For a range of views, see generally the essays collected in Agora: Future Implications of the Iraq Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003) (containing contributions from
Richard Falk, Thomas Franck, Tom Fraser, Richard Gardner, Miriam Shapiro, Jane
Stromseth, William Howard Taft IV and Todd Buchwald, Ruth Wedgwood, and John
Yoo).
2 See Anthony Clark Arend, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Military
Force, WASH. Q., Spring 2003, at 89, 101; Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The
United Nations After Iraq, 97 A. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003); Michael J. Glennon, Why the
Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2003, at 16, 16-35; Richard Perle,
Thank God for the Death of the UN, GUARDIAN, Mar. 21, 2003, at 26.

3 See Christopher Greenwood, International Law and the Pre-emptive Use of Force:
Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda, and Iraq,4 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 7 (2003); William H. Taft IV &
Todd Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq and InternationalLaw, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557, 558-63

(2003); Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and
Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM.J. INT'L L. 576, 587-82 (2003). The principal argument
is that Security Council Resolution 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/678 (1991), prior to the first U.S. conflict with Iraq, authorized the
United States and allied nations to use all necessary force to restore the government
of Kuwait and to bring peace and stability to the region. Although allied action restored the government of Kuwait in 1991, Saddam Hussein's continuance in power
prevented peace and stability in the region, and thus Resolution 678 (which had not
been withdrawn) constituted a continuing authorization of military action against the
Iraqi regime. Saddam had also signed a cease-fire ending the Gulf War, which he
then systematically violated. See S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at
1529
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But focus upon the legality of the U.S. actions standing alone misses a
broader picture. As elaborated in this Article, the U.S. action can be
fully assessed only against the background of the Security Council's
failure to perform its intended role in the maintenance of international security and the enforcement of international security law.
In assessing the Iraq debates, Richard Falk has argued that "the
U.N. Security Council served the purposes of its founding by its refusal to endorse recourse to a war that could not be persuasively reconciled with the U.N. Charter and international law. ' 4 This Article
emphatically disagrees. The essential feature of a viable system of collective security is credible and aggressive policing to deter and punish
violations of international security law. That feature, I argue, is fully
consistent with the U.N. Charter as it was originally conceived, but has
been essentially eliminated from modern U.N. discourse by two propositions, that are not properly part of the U.N. legal system, but that
played an essential role in the Council's decision not to endorse the
war in Iraq. These two propositions are, first, that force should be
used only as a last resort, as a response to actual attack or imminent
threats of attack; and second, relatedly, that a nation's sovereignty is
essentially inviolable, such that the use of force for the purpose of
overturning an established government-no matter how illegitimate
or reprehensible-can be justified only on the most extreme exigency. Taken together, these propositions have a crippling effect on
the ability of the U.N. system to provide effective policing of international security law. This effect can be seen most clearly in the Council's relations with Iraq, not merely in 2002-2003, but throughout the
course of Saddam Hussein's unfortunate history in power. The Coun11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (1991) (highlighting Saddam's various cease-fire obligations, including disarmament and inspections). As everyone recognized, Saddam remained in material breach of his cease-fire obligations in 2002. See S.C. Res. 1441,
U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (unanimously concluding that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations" under the ceasefire resolution). Resolution 678, taken with Resolutions 687
and 1441 and related resolutions identifying Saddam's continuing breach, appears to
give sufficient Council approval for the 2003 attack, even though a majority of the
Council in 2003 likely opposed it.
I find these arguments on the whole persuasive, as far as they go. But whatever
the legal effect of the prior resolutions, plainly the Council in 2003 refused to endorse military action, not because its members thought authorization unnecessary,
but because they wanted to block the attack. The purpose of this Article is to consider
whether the Council was right not to embrace military action against Iraq in 2003,
irrespective of the legal effect of that decision.
4 Richard Falk, What Futureforthe U.N.CharterSystem of War Prevention?, 97 Am.J.
INT'L L. 590, 590 (2003).
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cil never developed a satisfactory response to Saddam Hussein, because it thought any response must be limited by the force-as-lastresort and inviolability-of-sovereignty imperatives. That failure produced U.S. and allied action outside of the Council, because the
United States and its allies perceived that, limited by these imperatives, the Council could not perform its policing function as it was
originally intended.
Professor Falk errs, therefore, in arguing that the Council's inaction against Iraq"served the purposes of its founding"; to the contrary,
the Council's inaction represented a breakdown in the model of collective security envisioned by the Charter. At the same time, critics of
the U.N. system err in ascribing the breakdown to inherent problems
in its structure. The challenge is not to blame the United States or the
U.N. system for this breakdown but to encourage the Council to vindicate that system, and forestall actions outside the Council, by acting
forcefully against violations of international security law for purposes
of deterrence and punishment. Particularly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, undeterred and unpunished outlaw regimes are destabilizing and threatening to international peace and security, even
when they have no imminent plans for attack. The U.N. Charter
places responsibility for dealing with these regimes primarily upon the
Council, and largely disables individual nations from action outside of
the Council. 5 But nations such as the United States will give up their
independent ability to act against outlaw regimes only if they are confident that an effective collective entity will act in their place. As a
result, we need a new understanding of collective security that returns
it to the original idea of the U.N. Charter and frees it from undue
constraints that modern interpretations have placed upon it.
5 A substantial amount of literature argues that the U.N. Charter is consistent
with a broad notion of preemptive self-defense that could support an individual nation's action against outlaw regimes that constitute only an inchoate menace. See, e.g.,
William Bradford, "The Duty to Defend Them": A Natural Law Justificationfor the Bush
Doctrine of Preventive War, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1365 (2004); see also id. at 1387 n.80
(collecting additional sources); John Yoo, InternationalLaw and the War in Iraq, 97 AM.

J.

INT'L

L. 563, 571-74 (2003). Without mounting a sustained discussion of this posi-

tion, I think it fair to say that everyone holding this view depends to some extent upon

a "flexible" or "evolving" vision of the Charter that allows departure from its actual
words. The Charter's self-defense provision permits individual nations to act in selfdefense "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations"-and
not otherwise. U.N. CHARTER art. 51; see Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS
AND VALUES 295 (1995) ("[T]he Charter intended to permit unilateral use of force

only in a very narrow and clear circumstance, in self-defense if an armed attack occurs."); see also Bradford, supra,at 1383 n.67, 1386 n.76 (collecting additional sources
endorsing the so-called "restrictivist"-I would say "textualist"-view of the Charter).
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes two models
of collective security reflected in U.N. actions since the end of the
Cold War. The first model is the successful 1994 action in Haiti, in
which a Council-approved U.S. threat of force unseated the military
dictator Raoul C~dras and likely prevented a wider humanitarian crisis. This model also formed the basis of the U.S. appeal to the Council regarding Iraq in 2002-2003. The second model is the Council's
response to Saddam Hussein, where the Council permitted Saddam to
remain in power despite persistent violations of the basic principles of
international security law, and so ultimately induced the United States
and allied nations to act against the wishes of many Council members.
It is also reflected in the response to events in Kosovo, where again the
Council failed to formulate an effective response, leading the United
States and allied nations to act outside the U.N. system.
Part II describes two competing theoretical models of collective
security that echo the practical examples discussed in Part I. The first
model is based on John Locke's account of the formation of civil society. Central to Locke's account, this Part explains, is the use of collective force for deterrence and punishment. This forms one side of the
"Lockean bargain" that underlies civil society: individuals (or nations)
give up their right to defend their own interests (save against immediate attack) in return for a collective guarantee of security. The second
model, in contrast, involves a renunciation of the use of force, notjust
individually but collectively. Its exemplar is the 1928 Kellogg-Briand
Pact outlawing war, and more generally the interwar League of Nations, which lacked a collective enforcement mechanism and depended upon the good faith of its members. Part III argues that the
"Haiti model" embodies the original understanding of the U.N. system as a Lockean bargain, while the Council's response to Iraq
harkens back to the earlier approach of the League that the United
Nations, as originally understood, was meant to reject. This Part concludes that the proper role of the Security Council is policing against
threats to international security through deterrence and punishment,
as in Locke's civil society. In this view, the constraints sought to be
placed on Council action by Professor Falk and others-namely that
force should only be used as a last resort in response to an extreme
and imminent threat-are not part of the U.N. system. Part IV then
suggests that if the U.N. system is unable to reclaim its original mission, nations will necessarily act outside of its constraints. However,
this Part argues that to be justified in acting around U.N. machinery,
nations must remain true to its intent: that is, they must act to enforce
fundamental principles of international security, and not merely in
pursuit of their own interests. Accordingly, this Article concludes by
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defending the U.S. action in Iraq while cautioning against some broad
interpretations of the so-called "Bush Doctrine" of preemptive use of
force.
I.

Two

MODELS OF COLLECTIVE SECURrTY IN THE UNITED NATIONS

This Part suggests that two competing models of collective security can be seen in modern U.N. discourse and practice. The first is
illustrated by the Council's decisive (though often overlooked) action
in Haiti in 1994, and by the U.S. view of the Iraq situation in
2002-2003. In this vision, the U.N. Security Council is empowered to
use force (or rather, to authorize the use of force by member nations)
to respond broadly to threats against international security. The second, reflected in the Council's opposition to military action against
Serbia in 1999 and Iraq in 2002-2003 (and indeed in the Council's
approach to Iraq in general), sees the role of force as limited to responses to actual attacks or immediate threats, not as a broader police
power.

A.

Haiti: Decisive Action Against Sovereignty

The U.N. system of collective security reached its high point of
decisive action in Haiti in 1994. In 1991, a military coup by General
Raoul Ctdras toppled Haiti's democratically elected President Aristide, threatening to unleash a flood of refugees abroad and a humanitarian crisis at home. 6 The United States, as the nearest major power
and the nation most likely to be affected by refugees, brought pressure on the military government to restore democracy. Initial approaches consisted of diplomacy, diplomatic condemnation, and
ultimately economic sanctions instituted by the Security Council. 7 After a round of U.N. sponsored negotiations at Governor's Island, New
York, in 1993, Ctdras agreed to step down by October 30 of that year
and accept a peacekeeping mission. He then failed to relinquish
power, and armed demonstrations (sponsored, one may assume, by
C~dras) turned back the peacekeepers. 8 The Security Council then
passed a series of resolutions calling for C~dras to honor his agreement and re-imposing economic sanctions, 9 none of which had mate6

The principal events are recounted in

RYAN

C.

HENDRICKSON, THE CLINTON

WARS: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS, AND WAR PowERs 46-67 (2002).

7

S.C. Res. 841, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3238th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/841

(1993).
8 HENDRICKSON, supra note 6, at 46-67.
9 S.C. Res. 933, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3397th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/933
(1994); S.C. Res. 917, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3376th mtg. at 3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
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rial effect. In July 1994-that is, only about nine months after
Cfdras's repudiation of the Governor's Island Agreement-the Council approved Resolution 940, authorizing nations to use "all necessary
means" to remove C~dras.' 0 With that resolution in hand, U.S. President Clinton declared, "The message of the United States to the Haitian dictators is clear: Your time is up. Leave now, or we will force you
from power."' I
Clinton then dispatched a substantial force toward Haiti. At the
eleventh hour, with the U.S. Navy approaching Haitian waters and the
U.S. Air Force flying over Haitian airspace, C~dras agreed to a deal
brokered by former President Carter, in which he surrendered power
and left the country in September 1994.12 Aristide returned to power
relatively peacefully and U.S. forces did not engage in substantial hostile operations. The U.S./U.N. action did not solve Haiti's problems,
but those are beyond the capacity of security related operations to
solve. 13 The U.S./U.N. operation did defuse a potential international
crisis through a united use of force. Though force was not actually
used-making the operation a greater success-there is no doubt that
the united willingness to use force, and the direct threat of an immediate use of force, produced the desirable outcome.
The Council's action in Haiti is noteworthy in several important
respects. First, it represented a relatively quick resort to force.
Neither the United States nor the United Nations engaged in any material negotiations with Cfdras based on the status quo. Instead, negotiations focused almost entirely upon the goal of forcing Cedras
917 (1994); S.C. Res. 905, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3352d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
905 (1994); S.C. Res. 873, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3291st mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
873 (1993).
10 S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/940
(1994). This resolution authorized
members to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of
the military leadership, consistent with the Governor's Island Agreement,
the prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the restoration
of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, and to establish
and maintain a secure and stable environment that will permit implementation of the Governor's Island Agreement.
Id.
11 Address to the Nation on Haiti, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1558 (Sept. 15, 1994).
12 See Hendrickson, supra note 6, at 59.
13 After a relatively uneventful though unproductive decade, Aristide was again
forced from power by an internal uprising in 2004, but without the same degree of
violence and impending violence that arose in 1994. A new international peacekeeping force, approved by the Council, is now in place. See Special Report: Haiti after Aristide, The Economist, Mar. 6-12, 2004, at 22-23.
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from power-peacefully if possible, but with the clear commitment to
using force to achieve that goal if it was not forthcoming peacefully
and promptly. Indeed, the Carter mission that convinced C6dras to
surrender took place as U.S. troops moved toward the country with
the announced goal of a landing in force. One could easily have argued (and indeed some did argue) that additional rounds of diplomacy, combined with economic sanctions, might wring from C~dras
promises to mitigate the severity of his regime and work toward an
eventual transfer of power to civilian hands.1 4 The Council and the
United States, however, found sufficient proof of Cdras's duplicity in
his dishonor of the Governor's Island Agreement and concluded that
prompt resort to force was appropriate.
Second, the crisis, while important, was by no means an extreme
and imminent threat to international law and international security.
C~dras had overthrown a democratically elected regime, and his
heavy-handed security measures were producing a flood of refugees
whose lives were substantially at risk, either from C~dras's forces or
from natural elements. Though undoubtedly of great concern, these
conditions were regrettably not unusual, and indeed far greater humanitarian tragedies and security threats continued unabated elsewhere at roughly the same time.' 5 Haiti, in short, was a crisis, but not
a crisis of the first order.
Third, the U.S./U.N. action directly targeted Haiti's internal sovereignty. C~dras had no intent of affecting anything outside his own
borders. The refugees were an unintended byproduct of Haiti's internal convulsions. True, C~dras was not elected, and so in that sense
lacked legitimacy, but the U.S./U.N. action could hardly be described
as anything other than an intervention in the internal affairs of Haiti
(not unlike many prior unilateral U.S. actions in Latin America and
the Caribbean).1

6

In sum, in Haiti the U.N. system responded to and defused a developing threat to international security. It did so through a quick
14 See Mexico Criticizes Haiti Resolution, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 2, 1994, at
20.
15 The practical effect of the potential flood of refugees upon the United States
no doubt focused U.S. attention upon this particular crisis as opposed to contemporaneous but more distant ones. See HENDRICKSON, supra note 6, at 45-46. A realistic
view of the reasons why Haiti became a priority should not, however, detract from the
operation's success.
16 For this reason, some commentators argue that the Security Council exceeded
its authority in Haiti by interfering in the domestic affairs of a member state in violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter. See MICHAEL GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER Kosovo 101-43 (2001).
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resort to force, an early response to a situation that was far from crisis
proportions, and a direct interference in the internal affairs of a country to achieve the ousting of a particular regime. The fact that war did
not actually occur, because the threat of force was sufficient, obscures
the degree that the Haiti operation represents the high point of U.N.
17
willingness to use force to displace a sovereign government.
B.

Iraq: Inconclusive Action in Response to Major Threats to Security

In the U.N. debates of 2002 and early 2003, the United States,
Britain, and their allies envisioned a role for the Security Council that
echoed the Haiti experience. By any measure, Saddam Hussein was a
far greater violator of international security law than Cedras. Saddam
had violated fundamental principles of international security law in at
least five ways. First, he waged wars of aggression untempered by any
material justification beyond territorial aggrandizement, first against
Iran and later against Kuwait. Second, he not only pursued chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons through illicit channels, but actually
used chemical weapons, against Iran and later against Kurdish rebels.
Third, he openly supported terrorism by endorsing not just the Palestinian cause but the methods of terror some of its advocates embraced, by providing financial support to these terrorist organizations,
and by his own sponsorship of an attempted assassination of the former U.S. President in Kuwait. Fourth, he conducted campaigns of
mass murder and torture against internal opponents. And fifth, he
persistently defied Security Council resolutions, beginning with demands that he evacuate Kuwait, continuing throughout the 1990s with
regard to treatment of separatist populations and weapons inspections, and culminating in 2002 with Resolution 1441 (which
threatened "serious consequences" for continued noncompliance). 18
17

While the Council authorized various other military operations in the post-

Cold War era, none of these aside from Haiti displaced a sovereign government. See
GLENNON, supra note 16, at 115-20.
18 S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1441 (2002). On the actions of the Iraqi regime, see WILLIAM SHAWCROSS, ALLIES: THE
U.S., BRITAIN, EUROPE AND THE WAR IN IRAQ 18-38 (2004); Tom J. Farer, The Prospect
for InternationalLaw and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621, 625 (2003)
(noting that "Iraq . .. had defied Security Council resolutions, blatantly violated (in
the recent past) the Charter's nonintervention norms, and grossly and systematically

abused human rights"); see also Taft & Buchwald, supra note 3, at 557-58. The Security Council's resolutions themselves recognized Iraq's violations of Council directives
on disarmament. See S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1441 (2002) (commenting that "Iraq has been and remains in material
breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions"); S.C. Res. 1205, U.N. SCOR, 53d
Sess., 3939th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1205 (1998) (calling Iraq's actions a "fla-
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The basic truth of each of these charges was not in doubt. It may
be that any one of them standing alone would not be regarded as a
fundamental challenge to international security (though several of
them, particularly aggression for territorial aggrandizement, are hard
to see in any other way). It may be that realism compels even combinations of them to be overlooked when committed by a sufficiently
powerful entity. But Saddam's Iraq was not such a power, and the list
of international crimes he accumulated set him apart from almost any
other contemporary ruler. (It should be noted that this indictment
stands apart from the debated, and as yet unsubstantiated, charges of
a substantial weapons of mass destruction program ongoing in
2002-2003.) The essential case against Saddam Hussein was that he
was an outlaw on matters of international security. No one seriously
disputed that. The question was whether it called for a response with
force.
Unlike in Haiti, the U.N. system responded in Iraq only at the
outermost margins. To be sure, the Council endorsed the U.S.-led
campaign to oust Iraq's forces from Kuwait in 1991, imposed economic sanctions, and engaged in protracted and inconclusive diplomatic maneuverings over weapons inspections. But none of these
actions made any material progress in what should have been the ultimate objective: to force Saddam Hussein to acknowledge a regime of
international security law or to drive him from power.
The 1991 Gulf War, viewed at the time as a resounding success, in
fact is emblematic of this failure. The supreme threat to international
security is aggression for territorial aggrandizement. No collective system that tolerates it can survive. Territorial aggrandizement was, pure
and simple, what lay behind Iraq's attack on Kuwait. To its credit, the
U.S. and its allies succeeded in pushing the Council into a defense of
Kuwait (although the Council likely would not have acted decisively
without U.S. pressure, and a substantial body of opinion at the time
held that economic sanctions were the appropriate response). 19 But
grant violation"); S.C. Res. 1137, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3831st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1137 (1997) (highlighting "continued violations"); S.C. Res. 1115, U.N. SCOR,
52d Sess., 3792d mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1115 (1997) (citing "clear and flagrant
violations"); S.C. Res. 1060, U.N. SCOR, 51st Sess., 3672d mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1060 (1996) (identifying "clear violations"); S.C. Res. 707, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess.,
3004th mtg. at 23, U.N. Doc. S/RES/707 (1991) (noting Iraq's "flagrant violation" of
its obligations).
19 See Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 63 (1991) (containing contributions from David Caron, Lori Fisler Damrosch
and Theodor Meron, Thomas Franck and Faiza Patel, and MichaelJ. Glennon);John
Quigley, The United States and the United Nations in the Persian Gulf War: New Order or
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the system balked at doing more than reversing Saddam's territorial
conquest. Saddam emerged from the war not materially worse off (except perhaps in prestige) than he entered it. Indeed, after a period of
consolidation against domestic enemies in the wake of the war, arguably he was stronger after the war than before. He made a bold bid
against the first principle of international security law, and faced with
a less resolute U.S. President he might well have succeeded; in any
event, the price for him in the long run was not substantial. Of
course, this was not entirely the Council's fault-the United States
and its allies stayed their military hand after the recovery of Kuwait,
although the language of the authorizing U.N. resolution seemingly
20
would have permitted further action to remove Saddam from power.
But text aside, the United States clearly would have been acting
against the weight of international opinion to continue, and few
voices within the Council or the international diplomatic community
21
favored a comprehensive military solution.
For other transgressions of the 1990s Saddam got off even more
lightly. From reports about Saddam's palaces and lifestyle, it seems
clear that while his subjects starved he was little affected by the array
of economic sanctions that the Security Council imposed. 22 Similarly,
the low-level military reprisals by U.S. and British forces during the
balance of the 1990s did little to effect Saddam's willingness to comply
with Security Council resolutions relating to weapons inspections or to
23
protect his domestic opponents from torture and murder.
The Council's response to Saddam is a striking contrast to the
1993-1994 events in Haiti. First, the U.N. system viewed the use of
Disorder?,25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1 (1992) (expressing reservations about need for and
legality of the Gulf War).
20 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/678 (1990) (authorizing "Member States co-operating with the Government of
Kuwait... to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990)
[relating to withdrawal from Kuwait] and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to
restore international peace and security in the area").
21 See Franck, supra note 2, at 612. Franck argues that the U.S.-led coalition was
not authorized to move on Baghdad even as a technical legal matter, a position that
seems hard to square with the text of Resolution 678. But see id. at 612 n.18 ( "The
U.N. Resolution never called for the elimination of Saddam Hussein. It never called
for taking the battle into downtown Baghdad.") (quoting President George H.W.
Bush). See generally Agora, supra note 19; Quigley, supra note 19 (discussing the legal
aspects of collective military action against Iraq in 1991).
22 SHAWCROSS, supra note 18, at 34-35. On economic sanctions generally, see Lori
Fisler Damrosch, The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT:
COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 274 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.,
1993).
23 See HENDRICKSON, supra note 6, at 138-59.
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force as a last resort against Iraq. That was the centerpiece of opposition to U.S. actions in 2002-2003. No one denied that Saddam had a
long history of violating international security law at that point, nor
that he remained completely unreconciled to any vision of collective
security through law or through the United Nations. The entire argument against military action rested upon the proposition that, at that
time, he posed no immediate threat to any other nation. Second, the
system saw force as an appropriate response only to the most extreme
violation of international security-invasion for territorial aggrandizement-and only to the extent absolutely necessary to reverse that particular violation. Thus once Kuwait was restored, the justification for
the use of force-in this view-dissipated, even though Saddam remained unrepentant. That is, force could be used to restore the status
quo, but not to deter and punish violations. Third, Saddam's regime
was not itself considered a legitimate target, despite his record of persistent violation. Removing Saddam from power was not permitted to
become an object of the Gulf War, and in the events of 2002-2003 the
goal within the U.N. system was always described only as weapons
24
inspections.
As Richard Falk observes in his defense of the Council,
[t]he diplomatic repudiation of the United States in the Security
Council resulted mainly from the factual unpersuasiveness of the
U.S. arguments about the threats associated with Iraqi retention of
weaponry of mass destruction and the claims of linkage between the
Baghdad regime and the Qaeda network, and the alleged failures of
deterrence and containment. There were no doubts about the brutality of Saddam Hussein's rule [nor, Falk might have added, about

24 The Council's reaction to events in Kosovo in 1998-1999, it should be noted, is
consistent with the "Iraq model." Again, no one doubted that Serbia's Slobodan
Milogevit was engaged in substantial violations of international humanitarian law in
Kosovo, with international repercussions including waves of refugees and destabilization of surrounding nations. See HENDRICKSON, supranote 6, at 117-37. The Council
called upon Serbia to end the "use of excessive force by Serbian police forces" and
imposed economic sanctions. S.C. Res. 1160, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3868th mtg. at 1,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1160 (1998). Like Saddam, MilogeviR ignored the Council's direction. As with Saddam, MilogeviCs transgressions far exceeded anything that had occurred or was likely to occur in Haiti. But the United States and its allies were unable
to gain Council approval for a resolution authorizing use of force against Milogevi.
The argument against U.N. action was that the matter was internal to Serbia, at least
to the extent that no attack had occurred or was likely to occur on neighboring countries, and so the use of force against Serbia's sovereignty was unjustified. See GLENNON, supra note 16, at 28-30 (recounting events at the Security Council concerning

Kosovo).
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his persistent violations of international security law], but there was
25
little support for recourse to war on such grounds.
Falk continues:
[RIather than 'a failure' of the United Nations, the withholding of
such a mandate represented a responsible exercise of constitutional
restraint. The facts did not support the case for preemption, as
there was neither imminence nor necessity. As a result, the Iraq war
seemed, at best, to qualify as an instance of preventive war, but
there are strong legal, moral and political reasons to deny both le26
gality and legitimacy to such a use of force.
In sum, the Council was not bound to act-indeed, seemingly was
bound not to act-absent a showing of imminent threat. This philosophical proposition was an indispensable element of the case against
use of force in Iraq. 27 It is in material tension with the Council's role
in Haiti (where, self-evidently, no such imminent threat existed) and,
as discussed in the next Part, with a view of the Council as a collective
enforcer of international security law.
II.

COMPETING THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A.

The Lockean Vision of Collective Security

This Part discusses two theoretical visions of collective security
among nations. The first can be traced to the ideas of John Locke.
Locke, of course, was not primarily a philosopher of international law,
but his account of how "civil society" is formed from the state of nature contains important insights for attempts to form civil society
among nations. 28 In Locke's well known "state of nature," individuals
outside of (or prior to) civil society stood in a position of equality to
each other, in the sense that they had no superior force to govern
25 Falk, supra note 4, at 595.
26 Id. at 598; see also Franck, supra note 2, at 616 (stating that the key to the
Council's decision was that "the overwhelming majority of nations... believed that
Iraq did not have a significant number of weapons of mass destruction or, if such
weapons and the necessary delivery systems existed, that they could be found by the
instituted system of inspections").
27 To be clear, I am speaking only of the legal and moral debate as manifested at
the time and afterwards. Realists might argue that the decisions of individual statemembers of the Council likely arose from geostrategic considerations rather than
their own justificatory rhetoric. See SHAWCROSS, supra note 18, at 97-104 (discussing
motivations of France and Germany during the Iraq crisis). Without denying the
need for a certain amount of realism, some insight can be gained as well by considering the argumentation at face value.
28 JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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relations between them. 29 That did not mean, according to Locke,
that there were no laws between them, for there was the "Law of Nature ... which willith the Peace and Preservation of all Mankind"; as
he continued, "The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it,
which obliges everyone: And reason, which is that Law, teaches all
Mankind, who but consult it, that being all equal and independent,
no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions." 30 But because the state of nature lacked a superior force, enforcement of the Law of Nature lay with each individual:
[T] he Execution of the Law of Nature is . . .put into every mans

hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of
that Law to such a Degree, as may hinder its violation. For the Law
of Nature would, as all other laws that concern Men in this world, be
in vain, if there were no body that in that state of nature, had a
power to execute that Law and thereby preserve the innocent and
restrain offenders, and if any one in the State of Nature may punish
another, for any evil he has done, everyone may do so. For in that
State of perfect equality, where naturally there is no superiority or
jurisdiction of one, over another, what any may do in Prosecution of
31
that Law, everyone must have a right to do.
And, Locke added, "[e] ach transgression may be punished to that degree, and with so much Severity as will suffice to make it an ill bargain
to the offender, give him cause to repent, and terrifie others from
doing the like."

32

This of course made for an unruly condition, for
it is unreasonable for Men to be Judges in their own cases, that selflove will make men partial to themselves and their friends. And on
the other side, that ill nature, Passion and revenge will carry them
too far in punishing others. And hence nothing but confusion and
disorder will follow ....33

The "proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature,"
Locke said, was civil society:
There, and there only, is political society, where every one of the
Members hath quitted this natural power [to execute the law of nature], resign'd it up into the hands of the community in all cases
that exclude him not from appealing for protection to the Law established by it. And thus all private judgement of every particular
Member being excluded, the Community comes to be umpire, by
29
30
31
32
33

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

269-76.
271.
271-72.
275.
274.
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settled standing Rules... and punishes offenses which any Member
34
hath committed against the society.

Locke primarily addressed the way governments are formed
among individuals, so his principal model was the policing power of
the state. Plainly, then, he contemplated the broad use of force by
"the community" to deter and punish violations. Indeed, that was essential to his system, for he saw "civil society" as a bargain in which the
individual gives up the individual right of policing in return for the
protection of the collective force. Further, Locke was clear that the
individual did not give up the right of immediate self-defense; the
powers transferred to the collective were deterrence and punishment.
Though focused on individual security, Locke's reflections have
important implications for collective security among nations-perhaps more practical ones, for Locke's account of how domestic governments are formed was, even to his mind, likely somewhat
metaphorical. Locke himself recognized that the best practical example of the state of nature was the condition existing between nations,
which (prior to collective security arrangements) had no superior
force to govern relations.3 5 Indeed, Locke's state of nature corresponded with contemporary international law theory, which identified
a "law of nations" governing relations among nations but posited no
superior power to enforce it. Thus, as in Locke's state of nature, each
nation had the power to execute the law of nations by insisting upon
its rights through force. This was the basis of just war theory at the
time, under which nations could make war to insist upon their rights
under the law of nations. 3 6 And, as in Locke's hypothetical state of
nature, that produced a messy situation, in which nations went to war
frequently over minor or pretextual matters.
Locke lived before the first moves toward collective security, but
he would have understood them as attempts to form a "civil society"
among nations just as he imagined had been done among individuals.
But here it is important to recognize a critical component of Locke's
civil society: the "Magistrate" to whom individuals delegate their
power to execute the law of nature. That is the critical bargain in
Locke's formation of society: individuals give up their right to protect
their own security (save in emergencies) in return for assurance that
the superior power will maintain security. In sum, the sine qua non of
34 Id. at 324.
35 Id. at 271.
36 See JJ. BURLAMAQUI, THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL AND POLITIC LAW 186-87
(Thomas Nugent trans.,Joseph H. Riley 1859) (1735); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW
OF NATIONS 310-15 (Joseph P. Chitty ed., 1839) (1758).
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a Lockean system is an effective power of collective enforcement
37
through deterrence and punishment.
B.

Collective Security as the Renunciation of the Use of Force

Locke's system is not the only way to look at collective security. A
competing vision is that collective security can be achieved through
the collective renunciation of force and the undertaking to resolve
disputes peaceably as a matter of moral and legal obligation. That
vision appeared most forcefully after World War I in the collective
security arrangement of the League of Nations 38 and particularly the
39
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact renouncing war.
The structure of the League was to an extent Lockean in original
inspiration: the world's nations would form a civil society by giving up
their right to use force in return for security through the League. The
difficulty was that the League never figured out how to meet its end of
the Lockean bargain. At least initially, this was not because the problem went unperceived. Early proposals would have provided the
League with a military force to implement its directives and once
those were abandoned important criticisms focused on the League's
lack of enforcement power. 40 But the Lockean aspects of the League
were crippled from the outset by at least three insuperable problems.
37

This is not to say that, in Lockean terms, no international law can exist as law

without a sovereign enforcer.

Cf JOHN AUSTIN,

THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE

DE-

200-02 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1832). Many
aspects of international law flourish without military enforcement, because nations
find it in their interest to promote international cooperation and find ways to punish
(diplomatically, economically, reputationally) nations that do not play by the rules.
See generally Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979). A Lockean system of
collective international security, however, would insist on collective force backing its
rules for entirely practical reasons.
38 See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, reprinted in GEORGE ScoTr, THE RISE AND
For leading sources on the
FALL AND OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 407-18 (1973).
TERMINED

League, see

ELMER BENDINGER,

A TIME FOR

ANGELS: THE TRAGICOMIc HISTORY OF THE

(1975); Sco-rr, supra. A more tendentious account, which nonetheless captures much of the League's philosophical underpinning, is contained in
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

PAUL JOHNSON,

MODERN TIMES: THE WORLD FROM THE TWENTIES TO THE NINETIES

23-31 (rev. ed. 1991). For a leading account of British interwar policy, reflecting
sharp criticism of the League, see CORELLI BARNETT, THE COLLAPSE OF BRITISH POWER
237-577 (rev. ed. 2002).
39 Treaty Providing for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy,
Aug. 28, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 2 Bevans 732 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
40 See BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 91-92 (recounting a French proposal to create a military force for the League "so superior to that of all nations or to that of all
alliances that no nation or combination of nations can challenge or resist it."); BARNETr, supra note 38, at 244-45 (describing British criticism of the League).
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First, the nations could not agree on the formation of a supranational
"police" force; the idea was scrapped, and any realistic hope of the
League being able to direct military force was further undermined by
the adoption of a unanimity rule in its Council (the executive body,
4 1 Seccomposed of great powers plus an array of smaller nations).
ond, the nations that might have served as enforcers of League principles proved not up to the task-Britain and France because they were
morally and physically exhausted by the efforts of the First42World War,
and the United States because it declined to participate.
But thirdly, the Lockean aspects of the League were undercut by
a competing vision of collective security that depended upon the collective moral and legal renunciation of the use of force. The League
was born of an essential revulsion at the idea of war, itself born of the
appalling and senseless horrors of World War I. The idea that nations
would renounce war and substitute peaceful dispute resolution
through arbitration, or through the moral force of the League, was
obviously attractive. As one historian describes it, leading founders of
the League "saw it not as a device for resisting aggression by collective
for such force, operating chiefly through
force but as a substitute
'moral authority."' 43 President Woodrow Wilson, a preeminent force
in the founding of the League, observed:
My conception of the League of Nations is just this: that it shall
operate as the organising moral force of men throughout the world,
and that whenever, or whatever, wrong and aggression are planned
or contemplated, this searching light of conscience will be turned
upon them, and men everywhere will ask, "What are the purposes
that you hold in your heart against the fortunes of the world?" Just
a little exposure will settle most questions. If the Central Powers

had dared discuss the whole purposes of this war for a single fortnight it never would have happened .... 44
41 See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 5.
42 On the U.S. failure to participate, prompted in large part by fear of entanglement in foreign peacekeeping, see BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 133-60.
43 JOHNSON, supra note 38, at 31. As a result of the "horrors and calamities of
war," Corelli Barnett writes,
the British in general felt that a new way must be found of conducting world
affairs. They therefore convinced themselves that disputes between nations
would henceforth be peacefully settled by means of the League's machinery
of talk, and that the unpleasant question of armed coercion of a bandit great
power might never arise.
BARNETT, supra note 38, at 247-48.
44 ScoTr, supra note 38, at 32 (quoting Wilson's speech in France, Dec. 21, 1918).
On Wilson's views generally, see THOMAS J. KNOCK, To END ALL WARS: WOODROW
WILSON AND THE QUEST FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER (1992).
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To implement this vision, the critical provision of the League's
Covenant was Article 12, by which
[t]he Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit
the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry
by the Council [an assembly of nations similar to the U.N. Security
Council], and they agree in no case to resort to war until three
months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or
45
the report by the Council.
This of course did not, at least formally, go the full way toward
renouncing the use of force-it only required attempts at peaceful
settlement first. But since the League had no substantial mechanism
to enforce either the commitment to peaceful settlement or the terms
of any settlement that might be developed, it depended instead upon
the moral undertakings of its members. As one treatise puts it, "[t] he
system of collective security envisaged in the Covenant rested, essentially, on the notions of disarmament (Art. 8), pacific settlement of
disputes and the outlawry of war (Arts. 11-15), a collective guarantee
of the independence of each member (Art. 10), and sanctions (Arts.
16 and 17). '' 46 But the sanctions, as a military matter, were illusory,
for practical and philosophical reasons-and so the Covenant depended fundamentally on the moral and legal undertakings of its
47
members.
As a result, the League could not operate as a Lockean system,
using collective force to deter and punish threats to security-both
because as a practical matter it lacked the power to function as an
enforcer, and because it rested in substantial part on the belief that
collective force would not be necessary. It depended instead upon its
members acting in good faith to renounce the use of force, backed up
by some vague suggestions of economic sanctions. That faith was explicitly enshrined in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, whose signatories
renounced the use of force without distinguishing between force used
for aggressive purposes and force used to respond to threats to international security. "The High Contracting Parties," its first article declared without qualification, "in the names of their respective peoples
45

LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.

46 D.W. BowETT, THE

12.

LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

15 (5th ed. 2001).

47 As Wilson described it, "What we seek is the rule of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." President
Woodrow Wilson, Address to the U.S. Senate (Jan. 22, 1917), quoted in GLENNON,
supra note 16, at 15. One can see here starkly the substitution, in Wilson's thought, of
moral force (the "organized opinion of mankind") for actual force (which is what
sustains the rule of law against transgressors in a Lockean system).
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•.. condemn recourse to war for the solution of international contro-

versies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their
48
relations with one another."
C.

The Iraq Debate and the Competing Visions of Collective Security

Returning to the modern debate over the appropriate role of the
Security Council, it should be clear that one model of Council action
responds to Lockean imperatives and the other does not. In the "Haiti model," the Council, acting through the military force of member
nations, acts in the place of individual nations to enforce international
security law. Its role contains a strong element of deterrence and punishment, and in particular it sees itself as authorized to attack and
drive from power regimes that violate fundamental principles of international security law. The analogue to domestic police (Locke's
"Magistrate") is close: police do not merely respond to immediate violations to restore the status quo ante, but act aggressively against lawbreakers to remove them from civil society.
As a result, when the United States wished to take action against
the military regime in Haiti, it did not do so unilaterally. Instead, it
appealed to the collective. Its case was premised on C6dras as an international lawbreaker (although not, as has been pointed out, one of
especially compelling magnitude). Nonetheless, the Council considered the problem in Haiti sufficient to take forceful action. 49
In contrast, in the "Iraq model" the policing function-that is,
the use of force against transgressors-is not merely taken away from
individual nations, but is in large part eliminated altogether. The use
of force is limited to immediate responses to actual attacks or imminent threats, only as a last resort and only to restore the status quo
ante. Thus, in the 1991 Gulf War, once Saddam's forces had been
48 Kellogg-Briand Pact, supra note 39, art. 1, 46 Stat. at 2345-46, 2 Bevans at
732-33. Of the Pact, Scott says that "[n]othing could characterise more aptly the
hopes and illusions of the late 1920s." ScoTr, supranote 38, at 185. On the ultimate

rejection by many League supporters of a Lockean model, Barnett quotes a leading
British voice, speaking in the late 1920s: "One of the most advanced French advocates
of the League once said to me that the true guarantee of peace in Europe was a

strong French army and a strong British navy. The sort of man who thinks that is the
sort of man who ought never to be allowed to touch international affairs." BARNETT,
supra note 38, at 284 (quoting Gilbert Murray).
49 As noted, see supra note 16, some commentators have argued that the Council
overstepped in Haiti because no issue of international security existed. Although I
disagree with that conclusion, the issue is not material to the point made here.
Whatever one's view of Haiti, there can be no doubt that the situation in Iraq in
2002-2003 involved issues of international security as opposed to purely domestic
matters. See infra Part IV.
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expelled from Kuwait, the U.N. system appeared to think that its use
of force was successful and complete. In Iraq in 2002-2003, the U.N.
system thought force could not be justified because there was no imminent threat of attack by Iraq, even though Iraq had violated an array of international security principles; the system thought that the
only permissible interest of the United Nations was to encourage Saddam to accept weapons inspections, rather than using force to remove
50
Saddam, the persistent transgressor, from power.
The Council's "Iraq model," then, is not a Lockean bargain that
takes the policing power from individual nations and assigns it to a
collective. It is not a reallocation for a more efficient use of force, but
rather a renunciation of force as an instrument of international order
(in most circumstances) and commitment to alternative dispute resolution (economic sanctions, diplomacy, negotiations) for most international security disputes. It echoes (although does not entirely
adopt) the Wilsonian vision of the League of Nations. 51 As discussed
below, after the catastrophic failure of the League, the pure version of
collective renunciation of the use of force lost much of its appeal. 52
But that vision underlies the "Iraq model," with the modification that
most commentators would (at least in theory) 53 endorse the collective
use of force against actual or imminent attacks. Again, the fundamental disconnect in 2002-2003 between the United States and its allies,
on one hand, and the France/Russia/Germany position on the other,
was that one side argued a Lockean vision of collective security that
envisioned aggressive policing by the Council, and the other did not.
This can be fairly characterized as the fundamental division in modern international security law, and the Iraq controversy brought it
forcefully to the forefront. 54
III.

THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

This Part argues that what I have called the "Haiti model" of collective security is faithful to the original principles of the United Na50 See supra Part I.B.
51 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
52 See infra Part III.B.
53 The qualifier is necessary because many people (including almost half of the
U.S. Congress) declined to endorse the use of force even to reverse Saddam's con-

quest of Kuwait, and a more compelling case for a collective use of force is difficult to
imagine. See generally Quigley, supra note 19 (challenging the necessity of the use of
force in the Gulf War).
54 As Richard Falk acknowledges, the debate was "not just factual, whether Iraq

was a threat and whether the inspection process was succeeding at a reasonable pace;
it was also conceptual, even jurisprudential." Falk, supra note 4, at 590.
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tions, while the "Iraq model" arises from values that are not part of the
original U.N. system, but instead look back to the ideals of the
League. As discussed above, the Iraq model depends upon a vision in
which force is used only as an absolute last resort, only in immediate
response to direct threats to international security, and only as necessary for an immediate abatement of the threat rather than in pursuit
of deterrence and punishment. It is contended that these principles
are enshrined in the U.N. Charter.5 5 This Part argues that they are
not, and that instead the Charter embraces the "Haiti model" of early
and decisive force to deter and punish violations of international security law at the expense of national sovereignty.
A.

Text of the Charter

The "last-resort" view of military force cannot be located in the
U.N. Charter read as a whole and, instead, has been engrafted onto
the system by later generations of international lawyers and diplomats
without foundation in original U.N. principles.
As an initial matter, no such principle can be found in the textquite the contrary. To be sure, Article 2(4) directs that members of
the United Nations shall refrain from the use of force (or threat of
force) against other members. 5 6 Correspondingly, Article 51 adopts a
narrow exception for force used in self-defense, permitting it only in
the case of actual armed attack. 57 Read together, the two provisions
appear substantially to limit a nation's ability to use force in response
to threats to international security. Indeed, Article 2(4) echoes Article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in its apparently comprehensive renunciation of war (adding only the self-defense qualification). 58
The critical point, however, is that these limitations apply only to
actions outside the U.N. system of collective security. Unlike the Covenant of the League, the Charter envisions a Security Council with substantial military force responding to international security threats. In
fact, the Charter's text envisions a stronger Council than actually exists, for it provides that member nations will place armed forces at the
55 See id. at 590 (arguing that the Iraq war "could not be reconciled with the U.N.
Charter" because no threat was imminent).
56 U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. ("All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of
the United Nations.")
57 Id. art. 51. ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack ccurs against a Member of the
United Nations .... ).

58

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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disposal of the Council. 59 In practice, nations have been unwilling to
do this, and the system has substituted the Council's authorization of
force by member nations directly. 60 But in either event, the Charter
says nothing about the Council using force only as a last resort or only
in response to imminent threats of attack.
Rather, the Council's mandate, from Article 39, is broad: "The
Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken .

.

. to main-

tain or restore international peace and security."' 6 1 And those
measures explicitly include a relatively unqualified resort to force:
should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in
Article 41 (embargo, etc.) would be inadequate or have proved to be
inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may
be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Thus Articles 2(4) and 51, together with Articles 39 and 42, encompass the Lockean bargain. The limits on an individual nation's
ability to use force are strict: no use of force except in response to an
actual armed attack. But the prerequisites for the Council's use of
collective force are minimal: only that the Council "determine [s] the
existence of any threat to peace" and the "Council consider[s]" that
nonforceful measures "would be inadequate or have proved inadequate.., to maintain

.

.. international peace and security." Once this

relationship is recognized, it should be clear that Article 2(4) does not
establish principles of sovereignty and non-use of force that constrain
the Security Council-only that constrain individual nations. The whole
point of the Council's military arm is to give nations a way to act collectively against the sovereignty of a transgressor where they could not
62
act individually.
59 U.N. CHARTER art. 43 ("All members of the United Nations... undertake to
make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special
agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.").
60 GLENNON, supra note 16, at 90.
61 U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
62 Indeed, Article 2(7) makes clear that the Council can act against sovereignty in
a way that individual nations cannot:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State . . . [but this provision] shall not prejudice the

application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII [relating to the actions of the Council].
Id. art. 2, para. 7. That is, once the Council identifies a threat to peace against which
nonmilitary actions would be inadequate, it can take actions that would otherwise
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The "Iraq model's" fundamental misreading of the Charter is reflected in the two major crises with Iraq, in 1990-1991 and
2002-2003. In 1990-1991 one might suppose that events vindicated
the Charter system, because the United States sought and received
permission to drive Saddam's forces out of Kuwait. But on any reading of the Charter's text, the United States did not require the Security
Council's permission to oust Iraq's forces from Kuwait, because Article 51 gave it a right ofjoint self-defense-that is, defense of an allyin response to an armed attack, which had surely occurred. The permission-of-the-Council approach must mean something more than defense against an armed attack, else the permission is superfluous. And
indeed that is presumably how the United States understood matters,
for it did not ask merely for permission to defend Kuwait (which it did
not need), but also for permission to "use all necessary means

. . .

to

restore international peace and security to the region," which the
Council granted. 63 In short, the Council gave the United States a general police power against Iraq, which the United States likely would
not have had otherwise due to the narrow drafting of Article 51 and
the broad drafting of Article 2(4). Unfortunately, once the battle for
Kuwait was won, both the United States and the United Nations forgot
the broader authorization and treated the matter as essentially closed.
But arguments that the United States could not proceed against Baghdad, because that was not necessary to defend Kuwait, 64 must rely on
something contained in neither the Charter nor the Council's
resolution.
Similarly, in 2002-2003, the argument was made that the United
States could not proceed against Saddam unless Saddam attacked first
(or an attack was imminent).65 Leaving aside the fact that the Council-authorized police power against Iraq remained in effect from the
previous war, that would have seemed a correct reading of the Charter's text. But the further argument was made that the Council would
not and should not authorize any U.S. action, because there was no
imminent threat and there remained possible peaceful avenues to restore the inspections regime. 66 Again, that argument has no basis in
the Charter's text. Neither Article 51 nor Article 2(4)-the only possiappear to be interventions in matters of domestic sovereignty-including displacement of sovereign governments such as Iraq's or Haiti's.
63 See S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963d mtg. at 27-28, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/678 (1990).
64 See Franck, supra note 2, at 612.
65 See Falk, supra note 4, at 595-98.
66 Id.; Franck, supra note 2, at 616.
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ble textual sources-apply to Council actions, only to individual
actions.
Instead, Articles 39 and 42 of the Charter authorize the Council
to use military force to combat "threats to peace" in order to "maintain or restore international peace and security." Thus the textual
question properly before the Council was not whether there was an
imminent threat to the United States, or even whether Iraq had a program for developing weapons of mass destruction, but whether Saddam's persistent violations of Council directives and international law
were a threat to international security against which nonmilitary
means had been ineffective.
B.

Context of the Charter

This reading of the Charter's text is confirmed by its context.
The Charter was drafted against the background of the League of Nations, the failed interwar effort at collective security. The essential
idea of the drafters of the Charter was not to repeat the failures of the
League, a goal that further supports the Council's power and duty to
67
act decisively against emerging threats.
As discussed, the League, for practical and ideological reasons,
relied upon faith in its members' collective moral and legal commitment to refrain from the use of force-rather than a Lockean conception of collective force-to maintain international peace and
security. 68 The League never seriously grappled with its Lockean
problem: it depended not upon enforcement but upon belief that its
members would not violate fundamental principles of international
security law. That faith proved tragically misplaced. It quickly became
apparent that many nations did not embrace the League's non-use of
force directive-whatever they might say on paper-and those that
did lacked the ability to respond. That became clear even as the
League came into being, as wars raged in Eastern and Southern Europe with no effective League response. 69 In the 1930s, the League
67 As Ruth Wedgwood observes, "[t]he United Nations Charter is appropriately
read, even now, as an attempt to overcome the failures of Woodrow Wilson's League
of Nations and its covenant of inaction .... This should inform the reading of [the
Charter]." Wedgwood, supra note 3, at 576. Leading accounts of the founding of the
United Nations, emphasizing the influence of the League experience, include TOWNSEND HooPES & DouGLAs BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N. (1997); EvAN
LuARD, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1982); and RUTH B. RUSSELL, A HISTORY
OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1940-1945

(1958).
68
69

See supra Part II.B.
ScoTT, supra note 38, at 51-76.
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witnessed the escalating succession of war and intimidation, from Japan's aggression against China, Hitler's rearmament, Italy's seizure of
Abyssinia, Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland and occupation of
Austria, and ultimately Hitler's demands upon Czechoslovakia and Poland that re-ignited war. The essential lesson of each of these episodes was that the League failed to respond with force as needed to
contain threats to international security. By 1939, the League and the
collective non-use of force was wholly discredited, and Britain and
70
France moved to contain Germany outside the League system.
When the nations reconvened after the war, they did so with full
appreciation for the League's failures. One supposed lesson of the
League was that the nonparticipation of the United States had
doomed it, and in 1945 the United States was correspondingly prepared-as it was not in the interwar period-to play a leading role in
protecting international security. 71 But U.S. absence had not been
the League's only problem. Because it depended too heavily on good
will, the League lacked the ability to do anything about nations which
acted outside the law. So a second lesson of the League was that the
democratic powers' disarmament (in particular in Britain) after the
First World War could be blamed in part for the Second: lack of armaments meant inability to respond to Hider and related threats in their
early stages. 72 At the founding of the United Nations, the United
States and its allies had an enormous share of the world's military and
economic power and had no intention of disarming. And further, the
United States had (for a brief moment) a nuclear monopoly. So the
United Nations, unlike the League, had a real prospect of having the
power to enforce international security law against most potential
transgressors.
A third lesson of the League was that failure to respond to aggression produced more aggression. Conventional accounts recite a succession of nonresponses: to Japan (1931), to Italy (1935-1936), and to
Germany (1938). 73 (One should add earlier and lower-level
nonresponses, especially to Poland's seizure of Vilna from Lithuania
in 1920.74) Part of the intended role of the Council, therefore, was to
coordinate a military response to such acts, which under the League
had proved impossible. But it is a mistake to think of this as the Council's chief role. Article 51 of the Charter carefully reserved (as the
70 See generally sources cited supra note 38.
71 See RUSSELL, supra note 67.
72 See BARNETT, supra note 38, at 494-506 (recounting British disarmament and
the extent it constricted British policy in the interwar period).
73 See generally BENDINGER, supra note 38; Scorr, supra note 38.
74 See BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 177-80 (describing the Vilna episode).
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League's covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact had not) individual
nations' right to so-called "collective" self-defense. 75 This meant that
members could act outside the Council to respond to aggression
against another nation, at least until the Council had the opportunity
to formulate an effective response. So the Council was not principally
a weapon against actual aggression-as reflected in the 1991 Gulf
War, where the Council's approval would not have been prerequisite
76
to the U.S. defense of Kuwait.
Moreover, the peril of nonresponse to actual aggression was not
the only-and perhaps not even the primary-lesson of the League's
inaction. World War II was so long and costly in large part because
Germany had built up an enormous offensive military capacity prior
to embarking upon its first full-scale threat of aggression (which came
quite late, in Czechoslovakia, in 1938). The Treaty of Versailles ending the First World War, while perhaps justly criticized for overreaching in some respects, established at least three formidable barriers to
the reemergence of German offensive power. Long before Germany
undertook any actual aggression, it systematically violated each of
these key provisions of international security law, in each case without
material response from the League powers, and with disastrous consequences for the League powers' ability to respond to German aggression when it did occur.
First, the Versailles Treaty generally required German disarmament, severely limiting the size of its army and navy, and forbidding
an air force altogether; the Treaty also prohibited manufacture and
possession of most heavy offensive weaponry. 7 7 Nonetheless, Germany began covert rearmament as early as the 1920s, a program that
greatly accelerated once Hitler came to power in 1933. Though nominally secret in its early stages, Britain and France knew well enough
what was going on, and in 1935 Hitler openly announced the introduction of a draft and the existence of the German air force (both
forbidden by the Treaty). 78 The League powers, to the extent they
had a coherent response, alternated between deploring Germany's re75 U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (referring to the "inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs").
76 The chief model of collective self-defense presumably was the declaration of
war by Britain and France against Germany in response to the German attack on
Poland in 1939-declarations not approved by the League and in some tension with
the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
77 BARNETT, supra note 38, at 249
78 Id. at 394-402 (discussing rearmament and the British/French reaction). Barnett reports that Germany had achieved substantial superiority over Britain by 1936.
Id. at 443.
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armament and seeking a negotiated solution that effectively ratified
the violations. 79 At no time, though, did the League powers seriously
consider military action to enforce the treaty obligations (and the
League itself did not address the matter). Yet as one military historian
points out, "German rearmament was the key to the future; it was that
fundamental violation of the Treaty of Versailles which, if left unrestricted, must eventually pave the way for the destruction of all the
rest of the post-war settlement."80
Second, the Versailles Treaty initially gave the Allied forces the
right to militarily occupy the Rhineland-that portion of Germany
west of the Rhine river, on the eastern border of France and Belgium.
The 1925 Locarno Treaty withdrew Allied forces in return for Germany's pledge to keep the Rhineland demilitarized.8 1 This pledge
was of enormous strategic significance in creating a buffer zone between France and Germany, and preventing Germany from establishing effective border defenses. Not only had Germany used the
Rhineland as the staging ground for its 1914 assault on France, but
denial of German fortifications in the region meant that a French attack on Germany would quickly carry into Germany's industrial heartland.8 2

In 1936, wholly in violation of the Locarno pledges, the

German army re-occupied the Rhineland; no justification existed for
the re-occupation, and Hitler-no doubt emboldened by the League's
ongoing nonresponse to the Italian invasion of Ethiopia-barely bothered to give one.8 3 Documents recovered after the war indicated that

the German military opposed the move, thinking that it would produce an armed response from the League (or at least from France) in
which Germany would be humiliated. Hitler insisted, correctly, that
84
no response would be forthcoming.
79 See BENDINGER, supranote 38, at 279-93. Germany's rearmament dramatically
altered the balance of power in Europe, as its prohibited armament exceeded Britain's in many areas. See Scorr, supra note 38, at 100, 282-83, 291-307; see also BARNETr, supra note 38, at 413-16.
80

BARNEr, supra note 38, at 395.

81 BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 209-31, 367-68
82 See BARNETT, supra note 38, at 249, 331 (discussing the strategic importance of
the Rhineland).
83 Id. at 382-83.
84 BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 367-70; Scorr, supra note 38, at 369-73. In
Scott's description of the tepid British response:
Widespread in Britain was a feeling that, although technically in breach of
treaties, Germany was committing no great crime in sending troops into territory which was, after all, German .... [The British government] seized
hopefully upon Hitler's declaration of good intentions, of his willingness to
conclude new security pacts, of his readiness to return to the League of Na-
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Third, the Versailles Treaty expressly forbade union between Germany and Austria. 85 The reasons were geostrategic and evident from
the map: in addition to enhancing Germany's population and industrial base (already larger than any other country in Europe other than
Russia), annexing Austria would allow German forces to advance to
the Italian border and to surround Czechoslovakia on three sides. In
March 1938 Hitler occupied and annexed Austria, which offered no
material resistence and ostensibly approved the annexation. The
League (of which Austria had been a member) was embarrassingly
silent-apparently concluding that this did not constitute aggression
since the Austrians supposedly approved of the union with Germany;
Britain and France, the chief architects of the Versailles settlement,
8 6
had nothing meaningful to say on the matter.
The combination of these three developments placed Hitler in
an enormously powerful position once he began threats of immediate
aggression against Czechoslovakia in the second half of 1938. To be
sure, the League's failure to confront other acts of aggression (by Poland, Japan, and Italy) no doubt suggested to Hitler that he too might
go unconfronted. That proved correct once he began issuing demands on Czechoslovakia. But by mid-1938 Hitler had already become sufficiently powerful that the democracies' only alternative to
surrender would have been a catastrophicwar. 8 7 Any realistic assessment of how Hitler could have been defeated without a costly war
must focus on the events that allowed Germany to become, by 1938,
an awesome offensive power. And that assessment could yield only
one conclusion: that League powers critically failed to respond to developing threats to international security when costly war could still
have been averted.
The post-war design of the Security Council, then, should be seen
principally as an effort to remedy this failing. Actual aggression could
be blocked by the coordinated acts of individual nations in response,
as permitted by the Charter's Article 51. The experience with Hitler's
tions. He had, he said, no further ambition but to live in peace and friendship with the rest of the world.

Scor, supra note 38, at 371-72.
85 See BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 127-28
86 On the annexation of Austria and accompanying lack of response, see ScoTT,
supranote 38, at 386-87. Bendinger indicates that Britain previously implied it would
not oppose Austria's annexation. BENDINGER, supra note 38, at 385. In any event,
Britain plainly declined to take a decisive line on the matter, either before or after it
occurred.
87 See BAe' E'rr, supra note 38, at 506-07, 526 (recounting pessimistic British assessments of possible responses to the Czech crisis).
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Germany, though, showed that this was not enough-not only must
aggression be resisted, but emerging threats must be dealt with before
they became fully developed. But the identification of developing
threats (as opposed to actual aggression) was a more sensitive enterprise that might not be safely vested in individual nations, for fear of
misuse. Accordingly, the Charter did not allow individual nations to
act in response to developing threats; to avoid the failures of the
League, it created the Security Council with the powers to do so.
As a result, the United Nations at least had the potential of a satisfactory Lockean bargain: members gave up the right to enforce international security law (except in the limited circumstances of Article
51), but, unlike in the League where nothing replaced it, the enforcement power shifted to the Council. Assuming the Council acted as it
should, that should have produced the beginnings of the process
Locke described: the substitution of civil society for the state of nature. Of course, it did not happen that way for many years, because
the rise of the Cold War prevented the Council from acting as it was
designed. But this does not take away from the fact that the United
Nations was designed as an instrument to apply collective force
against threats to international security, not as a collective renunciation of force in the image of the League.
IV.

IRAQ AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE LocKEAN BARGAIN

We can now see the U.S. appeal to the Council in 2002-2003 as
an appeal that the United Nations live up to its side of the Lockean
bargain. In the U.S. account, the United States had agreed in the
Charter to give up unilateral use of force (save in extraordinary circumstances) on the understanding that the Council would use force
to defend international security-in particular, to deter and punish
violations of international security law. 8 8 In Iraq, there could be no
88 See Address to the U.N. General Assembly in New York, 38 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 1529, 1532 (Sept. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Address] (calling on the United Nations to "serve the purpose of its founding" and enforce its resolutions as part of its
role in international law); see also Prime Minister Tony Blair, PM Statement Opening
Iraq Debate (Mar. 18, 2003), available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page
329 4 .asp (arguing the imperative of backing up Security Council resolutions with
force). Blair stated:
I have come to the conclusion after much reluctance that the greater danger
to the U.N. is inaction: that to pass Resolution 1441 [on Iraqi disarmament]
and then refuse to enforce it would do the most deadly damage to the U.N.'s
future strength, confirming it as an instrument of diplomacy but not of action, forcing nations down the very unilateralist path we wish to avoid.
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doubt of fundamental breaches of international security law, and so,
in Lockean terms, the Council was obligated to act. Its failure to act
would constitute an abdication akin to the failures of the League.
This vision underlies President Bush's call that the United Nations
"serve the purpose of its founding"8 9 by responding to Iraq.
In the opposing view, the United States and the international system generally had agreed to renounce the use of force (save in extraordinary circumstances) without any corresponding guarantee of
collective uses of force (except, again, in extraordinary circumstances); the essence of the U.N. system, in this view, was not the collective use of force but the collective renunciationof the use of force,
subject to narrow exceptions for attack or imminent threat of attack.
The Council's role, in this conception, was much more limited: to respond only to an imminent attack, not to exercise a general police
power. In Iraq there could be no justification for the use of forceunilateral or collective-because there was no attack or imminent attack, and no other use of force, even collectively, was permitted.9 0
Once the argument is framed in these terms, the U.S. position on
Iraq appears fundamentally sound and the Council's position seems
tenuous at best. As discussed, the Charter does not embody the renunciation of the collective use of force. To the contrary, both its text
and context confirm that it is a Lockean bargain to shift the use of
force to a collective entity but not to substantially renounce it. The
fundamental lesson of World War II, which the Charter's drafters took
to heart, was that failure to use force early in response to threats to
international security leads to tragic consequences in later years. The
idea of substantial renunciation of the use of force by the entire system is not part of the Charter, but is a holdover from the League and
especially from the Kellogg-Briand Pact. In particular, the idea that
the Council should only act militarily as a last resort, in response to an
imminent threat of attack would mean that the Council could have
been no more effective than the League in dealing with the rise of
Hitler. Hitler did not pose an imminent threat prior to 1938, so presumably the "imminent threat" version of the Council could not have
authorized action against him. Yet the League's failure to take early
action against Hitler was exactly what drove the drafters of the
Charter.
It might be argued, of course, that the Council in 2002-2003 simply did not share the U.S. view that Saddam posed a challenge to international security. The structure of the Council exists to ensure that
89
90

Address, supra note 88, at 1532.
See Falk, supra note 4, at 590.
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no single nation identifies and acts against developing threats (as opposed to actual attacks). The Council is (or is supposed to be) a deliberative body that evaluates claimed violations of international security
law, so the United States should not expect the Council to accept its
arguments uncritically. With the argument put this way, though, the
Council's decision seems much more difficult to defend. No one
could seriously deny that Saddam Hussein was a persistent violator of
basic notions of international security law. International security law
exists to maintain international peace and security; a leader such as
Saddam who challenges its fundamental principles is necessarily a
threat, because he lives outside the "civil society" of nations that the
security system seeks to develop. The Council recognized the threat,
in its continuing attention to the situation in Iraq and its many directives to Saddam (all of which he ignored). The question was whether
this challenge should cause the collective entity to act with force,
which is essentially a question of whether the collective entity has a
policing function.
Defenders of the Council, such as Professor Falk, do not deny
that Saddam was a persistent violator of international security law, but
rather insist that no military action should be taken against him except in response to an imminent threat and in the absence of all other
alternatives. 9 1 But a Lockean police power contains no "last resort" or
"imminent threat" imperatives, nor does the Council's mandate. Evidence that Saddam had defied and would continue to defy the basic
framework of international security law was overwhelming, and that
should have been enough to prompt-indeed to demand-military
action.
Iraq, then, represents the collapse of the Lockean bargain reflected in the Charter-as indeed had the earlier Kosovo episode. 92
That in turn explains the U.S. decision to act outside the Council system. Indeed, the U.S. decision to act outside the Council system was
nothing novel, but rather a continuation of the Cold War approach to
international security. During the Cold War, as essentially everyone
recognized, the Council could not act as originally designed, because
of the extreme hostility among Council members. As a result, the
United States took its international security measures largely outside
the Council system. 93 That was inevitable, because the Council institu91
92
93

Id.
See supra note 24.
For example, U.S. actions during the Cuban missile crisis are difficult to square
with the Charter. See ABRAM CHAYES, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES AND THE ROLE OF LAW 8-24 (1974) (describing the crisis); High Seas, 4 Whiteman
DIGEST § 2, at 523-24 (same); Quincey Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,57 Am.J.
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tionally could not uphold its end of the Lockean bargain. After the
end of the Cold War, the United States attempted to resurrect the
original understanding of the Council, and briefly there seemed some
hope of success. Events in Kosovo in 1999 and especially in Iraq in
2002-2003 showed, however, that the Council was not prepared to act
as an aggressive enforcer, but was captive to an ideology of the limitation on use of force that fundamentally undercut the Lockean bargain
originally intended.
As a result, the United States and its allies in Kosovo, and then in
Iraq, saw no imperative in upholding their end of the Lockean bargain, and reverted to enforcement of international security law
outside the Council. This cannot be attacked on collective security
grounds, for the collective security system had failed. There was no
credible argument in Iraq that substantial violations of international
security law had not occurred. The only argument against an imperative of intervention depended on claims that the use of force should
be greatly limited and that a nation's sovereignty (in Iraq's case, the
integrity of an outlaw regime) is violable only in the direst emergency.
But that argument appeals to principles that are not part of the original U.N. bargain and are not part of a realistic approach to collective
security. Instead, it appeals to the belief that security can best be
achieved by global renunciation of force (even in enforcement)-a
principle of the interwar League that was largely discredited and
which the United States never seriously accepted.
The implications for the future are clear: the Council must
refocus on the Lockean principles of collective security, including a
robust use of force, to deter and punish violations of international
security law. Leaders such as Saddam Hussein and Slobodan
Milogevie must understand that actions that defy the system of international security will be punished by collective force, specifically with the
goal of removing them from power. Otherwise, the system contains
no credible deterrent and no credible enforcement power. As a result, what is needed is for the Council to embrace a serious campaign
to use force against outlaw regimes.
Calls for the Council to act with more resolution are common
enough. As Jane Stromseth has argued,
L. 546, 555-56 (1963) (arguing that President Kennedy's use of force to blockade
Cuba and prevent Soviet missiles from landing was not permissible as a self-defense
measure under Article 51 of the Charter); see also Dean Acheson, Remarks by the Honorable Dean Acheson, 57 PROC. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 13, 14 (1963) ("[T]he propriety of the

Cuban quarantine [was] not a legal issue ....

law.").

The survival of states is not a matter of
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the Security Council faces a severe test of its credibility. The future
effectiveness and durability of the Security Council will depend on
its willingness to take credible enforcement action in response to
threats to peace and security. If the Charter system is to serve as a
bulwark against those who would potentially use weapons of mass
destruction, then the Council must be prepared to enforce its de94
mands-to stand up to those who would defy its will.

The Council's ability to do this, however, further depends on
reconceptualizing its role as an aggressive enforcer of international
security law, rather than as an entity whose use of force depends upon
the demonstration of an "imminent" attack. A verbal formulation that
sets too demanding a standard for the collective use of force provides
an easy refuge for those who are reluctant to act. Instead, the Council
needs to embrace responsibility for ensuring that fundamental principles of international security law are enforced, and that the persistent
violation of such principles is in itself sufficient basis for action. The
Council has shown, in the Haiti episode in 1994, that it can act in this
way. 9 5 That successful operation can provide a model for future
Council actions.
The alternative, as the Kosovo and Iraq episodes demonstrated, is
that nations will act outside the system to accomplish the results the
system was supposed to have-but has not-achieved. Professor
Stromseth adds: "[I] f France and others are not willing to support coercive diplomacy backed by a credible-and authorized-threat of
force, then the United States will cease to turn to the Council and the
Council's role in responding to threats to peace and security will be
diminished." 96 That is the inevitable result of the collapse of the
Lockean bargain: if the "Magistrate" does not provide an effective regime of deterrence and punishment (not merely a regime of emergency response) there will be no resulting civil society and no

94 Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force After Iraq: A TransitionalMoment, 97 AM. J.
L. 628, 636 (2003); see also Elias Davidsson, The U.N. Security Council's Obligations
of Good Faith, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 541 (2003) (arguing that the Council has duty to
authorize the use of force in appropriate situations); Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1519 (2003) (criticizing the Security Council
for failing to authorize action against Saddam). Secretary-General Kofi Annan has
suggested that the Council "may need to begin a discussion on the criteria for an early
authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of threats, for instance,
terrorist groups armed with weapons of mass destruction." Kofi Annan, In Annan and
Chirac's Words: 'Fork in the Road'and 'Call a Summit, 'N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2003, at Al3.
95 See supra Part I.A.
96 Stromseth, supra note 94, at 637.
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resulting duty of obedience to either the "Magistrate" or the legal system he represents.

97

CONCLUSION

The events of 2002-2003 were a culmination of a debate over the
role of the Security Council in collective security. On one side, the
United States insisted that the Council's role was to enforce (that is,
deter and punish violations of) international security law. Saddam
Hussein, an undisputed persistent violator of international security
law, in this view was an appropriate target of collective force. The
opposing side argued that force could be used only in response to an
extreme emergency and only to avert the emergency (not to punish
past or to deter future transgressions). On this view Saddam was not
an appropriate target of collective force because no such emergency
existed (a point largely conceded by the United States and its allies).
This Article has argued that the United States had the better of
this debate for two essential reasons. First, a realistic system of collective security must include robust methods of deterrence and punishment through force. That is the lesson of John Locke's theory of civil
society, whose formation depends upon a bargain to surrender individual rights of deterrence and punishment to a collective body that
will act to those purposes. It is also the lesson of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which had no collective mechanism for enforcement through military action and proved unable to
contend with the rise of transgressor states such as Hitler's Germany.
Second, the strong vision of collective security is embodied in the original understanding of the U.N. Charter, which renounces individual
but not collective policing. In particular, the Charter was a response
to the failure of the League and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and to the
broader ideal that peace could be obtained by global renunciation of
force.
As a result, the U.S. action in Iraq should be understood as a
response to a breakdown in the U.N. system, in which the Council
became captive to renunciation-of-force ideals that are not part of its
97 As Locke emphasized, the "Magistrate" had a duty of protection, and failure to
uphold that duty meant that the "Magistrate" could no longer command allegiance of
subjects. LocKE, supra note 28, at 410-11. As Locke put it:

There is one way more whereby such a Government may be dissolved, and
that is, when he who has the Supream Executive Power, neglects and abandons that charge, so that Laws already made can no longer be put into execution .... For Laws [are not] made for themselves, but to be by their
execution the Bonds of Society.
Id. at 411.
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Charter. It was thus an entirely predictable reaction to the Council's
failure to fulfill its end of the Lockean bargain. Where Locke's "Magistrate" lacks the power, or will, to act as enforcer, civil society will
break down and nations, or individuals, will pursue their individual
rights of enforcement. That is regrettable, but not reprehensible, nor
is it remedied by anything other than the "Magistrate" performing its
functions.
The implication, then, is that the United States may be justified
in acting around the Security Council when that system fails to respond to undeniable threats to, and violations of, international security law. That precisely describes what happened in Iraq. But it also
suggests caution in future episodes. Locke's state of nature was not a
state of lawlessness. Breakdown of collective security encourages and
may indeed entitle nations to act outside the system of collective security, but it does not follow that they are thereby entitled to act
outside all of international law. They are not entitled to act simply to
suit their own interests; rather, they are entitled to perform the enforcement role that the collective entity should be, but is not, performing. This suggests some limit on the so-called "Bush Doctrine" of
preemptive warfare. 98 The problems at the United Nations may allow
the United States to act outside the Security Council to counter violations of, and threats to, international security-but no more than that.
As a result, actions outside the Council should be tied to (1) failure of
the Council to act after an appropriate request, and (2) persistent and
unmistakable violations of international security law by the target of
U.S. action.

98 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (setting out the Bush Administration's idea of preemptive action); see Bradford, supra note 5, at 1422-25 (describing and defending implications of the National Security Strategy); Yoo, supra note 5,
at 571-76; see also Stromseth, supra note 94, at 635 (describing the Strategy as reflecting "a doctrine of preemption whose parameters are uncertain and that is potentially
very broad in scope"). As suggested in the text, one way to narrow and focus the
United States' claimed right of preemption is to limit it to regimes that are persistent
violators of basic principles of international security law.

